In Re: Revstone Industries by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-6-2017 
In Re: Revstone Industries 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Revstone Industries" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 671. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/671 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
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_____________ 
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                                      Ascalon Enterprises LLC, 
                                                                                Appellant  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware                                                          
District Court No. 1-15-cv-00347 
District Judge: The Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
                               
Argued March 22, 2017 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 6, 2017)      
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919 North Market Street 
P.O. Box 8705, 17th Floor 
Wilmington, DE  19801 
 
Alan J. Kornfeld  [ARGUED] 
Pachulski Stang Ziehl & Jones 
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13th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
 Counsel for Appellee 
                        
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION* 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Chief Judge.
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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 In this bankruptcy case, the debtors, Revstone Industries, LLC (“Revstone”) 
and associated entities, proposed a Chapter 11 plan approved by almost all 
creditors. The plan provides for the eventual “sale of all or substantially all of the 
property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4); see In re PPI Enterprises (U.S.), 
Inc., 324 F.3d 197, 211 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A] debtor may develop a Chapter 11 plan 
to sell off all of its assets.”). Ascalon Enterprises, LLC (“Ascalon”), Revstone’s 
sole member and a non-creditor, filed a limited objection to the plan. According to 
Ascalon, Revstone is not entitled to discharge certain debts, as provided in Article 
X of the plan, because Revstone would “not engage in business after 
consummation of the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)(B). The Bankruptcy Court 
disagreed. It concluded that Revstone is entitled to discharge because, after 
emerging from bankruptcy, Revstone will continue to operate its business in 
substantially the same manner as it did before filing for bankruptcy. [A516] The 
Bankruptcy Court approved the plan over Ascalon’s objection, and Ascalon timely 
appealed. The District Court affirmed, and Ascalon timely appealed again.1 
 We conclude that Ascalon lacks standing to appeal. We will affirm on that 
alternative ground. See, e.g., Oss Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 
                                                 
 1 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 
1334. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) and 
1334. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291. 
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F.3d 756, 761 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[We] may affirm a judgment on any ground 
apparent from the record, even if the district court did not reach it.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 APPELLATE BANKRUPTCY STANDING  
 Appellate standing in bankruptcy is limited to “persons aggrieved” by an 
order of the bankruptcy court. In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 214 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). The persons-aggrieved test “now exists as a 
prudential standing requirement that limits bankruptcy appeals to persons ‘whose 
rights or interests are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order or 
decree of the bankruptcy court.’” Id. (further quotation marks omitted) (quoting In 
re Dykes, 10 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 1993)). To be a person aggrieved, a party must 
challenge an order that “diminishes their property, increases their burdens, or 
impairs their rights.” Id. (quoting In re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2000)). 
 This standard is “more restrictive than Article III standing.” Id. at 215. 
Appellate bankruptcy standing, unlike Article III standing, must be based strictly 
on financial injury. Id. Furthermore, this Court has denied standing to parties 
“who, even though they may be exposed to some potential harm incident to the 
bankruptcy court’s order, are not directly affected by that order.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45 F.3d 
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737, 741 (3d Cir. 1995)). These requirements are rooted in the “‘particularly acute’ 
need to limit appeals in bankruptcy proceedings, which often involve a ‘myriad of 
parties . . . indirectly affected by every bankruptcy court order[.]’” Id. (alterations 
in original) (quoting Travelers, 45 F.3d at 741). 
  ASCALON’S STANDING ARGUMENT  
 In its reply brief, Ascalon argues that it has standing based on the tax 
consequences of discharging certain liabilities under the plan. According to 
Ascalon, it designated Revstone as an S corporation, and thus any tax liability 
would pass from Revstone to Ascalon. Ascalon claims that Revstone incurred 
millions of dollars in unpaid federal and state taxes arising from asset sales during 
bankruptcy. Subsequently, Ascalon elected to revoke Revstone’s pass-through 
status, ending Ascalon’s liability for Revstone’s tax obligations. See I.R.C. 
§ 1362(d); In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(discussing the revocation of a debtor’s pass-through status). According to 
Ascalon, Revstone stated in open court that it intends to have Ascalon’s tax 
election set aside. 
 Against that backdrop, Ascalon argues that it “is justly apprehensive that, if 
Revstone discharges its tax liability, the taxing authorities might seek to impose 
liability on Ascalon, despite the election it made.” Reply Br. 1–2. 
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APPLICATION 
 Ascalon’s argument does not establish standing because it is waived, and in 
any event, fails to allege a sufficiently direct financial interest in the litigation.2 
 Ascalon’s explanation for its own standing has shifted throughout this 
litigation. In the District Court, Ascalon argued that it has standing as a creditor 
because it submitted a claim that the Bankruptcy Court disallowed without 
prejudice. Ascalon has now abandoned that argument3 and raises the taxation issue 
for the first time on this second-level appeal. “[A]rguments not squarely put before 
the district court are waived on appeal.” Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 
121, 139 n.8 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing P.R.B.A. Corp. v. HMS Host Toll Roads, Inc., 
                                                 
 2 The District Court declined to address standing, “[g]iven the lack of timely 
objection or cross-appeal.” In re Revstone Indus., LLC, No. 15-347, 2016 WL 
1271462, at *2 (D. Del. Mar. 30, 2016). We disagree with that analysis. 
 Our sister circuits are divided on whether a party may waive a defense based 
on prudential standing. See Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 340 n.14 (3d Cir. 
2012). We need not decide that issue because Revstone timely preserved its 
standing objection at every stage of the proceeding. Nor was Revstone required to 
take a cross-appeal. As the prevailing party in the Bankruptcy Court, it was not 
“aggrieved,” and thus lacked standing to file a separate appeal. See Deposit Guar. 
Nat’l Bank, v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980); Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin 
Mem’l Hosp., 857 F.2d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Smith v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 593 F.3d 280, 283 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Yet a party, without taking a 
cross-appeal, may urge in support of an order from which an appeal has been taken 
any matter appearing in the record, at least if the party relied on it in the district 
court.”). 
 3Ascalon re-raised this issue at oral argument, despite excluding it from its 
briefing. Because the argument was not presented in any of Ascalon’s briefs, it is 
waived. See Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 230 n.17 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
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808 F.3d 221, 224 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015)); cf. Nichols v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 836 
F.3d 275, 282 n.1 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that the plaintiff waived an argument in 
favor of standing). Furthermore, Ascalon’s standing argument is articulated for the 
first time in its reply brief, and does not explain Ascalon’s injury beyond the single 
sentence quoted above. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 824 F.3d 33, 53 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived on 
appeal); John Wyeth & Brother Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n.6 
(3d Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments raised in passing . . . , but not squarely argued, are 
considered waived.”). 
 Regardless, Ascalon’s “apprehensi[on]” about what the taxing authorities 
“might” do, Reply Br. 1–2, is not sufficiently direct to establish appellate 
bankruptcy standing. Any consequences flowing from Revstone reverting to a 
pass-through entity are “too contingent” to establish standing. Travelers, 45 F.3d at 
742; see id. at 742–44 (rejecting appellate standing where the claimed injury was 
based on future litigation). But more fundamentally, Ascalon has failed to provide 
any support for the proposition that the Bankruptcy Court’s discharge injunction 
permits the relevant authorities to assess Ascalon for Revstone’s tax liability, let 
alone demonstrate a “direct[] or immediate[]” danger that a taxing authority will do 
so. Id. at 742. 
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 At oral argument, Ascalon acknowledged that it may fail the persons-
aggrieved test but argued for the first time that that we should abandon that 
standard. That argument is also waived. In any event, the persons-aggrieved test is 
well established in our precedents, which we are bound to follow. IOP 9.1. 
CONCLUSION 
 Because Ascalon failed to carry its burden to establish appellate standing, 
we will affirm. 
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